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State v. Henson:
TIME BETWEEN
A FIRST AND
SECOND ARREST
ARISING OUT OF
THE SAME
CRIMINAL ACT
IS NOT INCLUDED
IN SPEEDY TRIAL
ANALYSIS IF
CHARGES ARE
DISMISSED IN
GOOD FAITH.

In State v. Henson, 335
Md. 326, 643 A.2d 432 (1994),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that when criminal
charges are dismissed in good
faith by the State and later reinstated, the time period involved
in the speedy trial analysis does
not begin until the second prosecution has commenced. However, if the dismissal was made
in bad faith, the date of the
arrest or formal charge in the
initial prosecution should be the
starting point for the speedy
trial analysis.
RespondentErik Henson
("Henson") was indicted on
May 8, 1990, for assault with
intent to murder and related
charges arising from a shooting
on May 11, 1989. He was arrested on February 22, 1992,
and subsequently filed a motion
in the Circuit Court of Prince
George's County to dismiss for
lack of a speedy trial. At the
hearing on the motion, it was
brought to the court's attention
that the Respondent had been
previously arrested on May 25,
1989, and prosecuted for the
same charges. This initial prosecution was terminated on July
26, 1989, when the State dismissed, by nolle pros, the charges pending against Henson.
The motions court denied the Respondent's motion
and held that the time between
the Respondent's arrest on the
initial charges and the Respondent's subsequent reindictment
following the dismissal of the
charges was excluded from the
speedy trial analysis. In an unreported opinion, the Court of

Special Appeals of Maryland
disagreed with the motions court
and held that the Respondent's
speedy trial time frame began to
run from the date of the initial
arrest.
The Court ofAppeals of
Maryland granted certiorari to
determine whether the period
between the Respondent's arrest on the initial charges and his
subsequent indictment is included in the speedy trial analysis if
the State dismissed the charges
in good faith. The court of
appeals held that the time period is not included in the analysis. Therefore, the court of
appeals vacated the court of
special appeals' decision and
remanded the case with instructions to vacate the judgment
and remand the case to the circuit court to determine whether
the State had dismissed the initial prosecution in good faith.
The court of appeals
began its analysis by defining
the constitutional standard applicable in speedy trial cases.
The court determined that the
factors to be weighed in deciding if a pre-trial delay is prejudicial are: the length of the delay,
the reason for the delay, the
defendant's assertion of his or
her right, and the prejudice to
the defendant. Henson, 335
Md. 326, 332, 643 A.2d 432,
436 (1994) (citing Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972».
The length of pre-trial delay
determines whether the delay is
prejudicial and therefore, the
first factor becomes the threshold issue. Since the present
delay was less than the 180 day
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constitutional limit, the court
concluded that the Respondent
had not been prejudiced in any
way, and the application of the
remaining factors was unnecessary.
While the time from the
initial arrest or formal charge
and the trial is the relevant period for speedy trial analysis, this
period may be different if the
prosecution is dismissed and
later reinstated. Id at 333,643
A.2d at 436. The court applied
United States v. MacDonald,
456 U.S. 1 (1982), which concluded that the Speedy Trial
Clause does not apply to the
time frame between the State's
good faith dismissal of the charges and the reinstatement of the
charges. Henson, 335 Md. at
333,643 A.2dat436. Byimplication, ifthe State dismissed the
charges in bad faith, the period
between dismissal and reindictment
was included in the computation so that the speedy trial analysis dates back to the initial
arrest or filing of charges.
Good faith, as defined
by the court, is the lack of intention to "circumvent the speedy
trial right." Id at 338, 643
A.2d at 438. A distinction between a good and bad faith dismissal is needed to prevent the
State from dismissing the charges soley to avoid a violation of
the Respondent' s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
When the State has acted in
good faith in dismissing the
charges, the court reasoned that
the period between the good
faith dismissal of the prosecution and the reinstatement ofthe

prosecution should not be considered in the speedy trial analysis. Id at 336, 643 A.2d at
437.
Whether the time between the initial arrest and the
dismissal in the district court
must be considered in the computation ofthe speedy trial time
frame was the next consideration of the court. Id at 337,
643 A.2d at 438. The Sixth
Amendment guarantees that the
State will proceed with diligence
to assure that the charges will be
disposed of in a timely manner.
Id at 337,643 A.2d at 438. As
a result, this ensures the protection ofa person's specific interests in decreasing the incarceration period before trial, reducing the impairment of liberty if
released on bail, and minimizing
the disruption oflife caused by
arrest and criminal charges. Id.
at 337, 643 A.2d at 438. Since
the Respondent's interests are
the same before and after the
dismissal of the initial charges,
his interests are not afforded
any additional protection just
because they existed before the
dismissal. Id at 338, 643 A.2d
at 438. As long as the dismissal
of the initial charges is in good
faith, the intervening time between the initial arrest and dismissal of the charges is not
counted in computing whether
the speedy trial requirement has
been met.
To decide which time
frame should be applied in analyzing whether there has been a
speedy trial, a determination of
good faith is necessary. Since
the issue of whether the dis-

missal of the initial charges was
made in good faith was not determined by the lower court, the
court of appeals remanded the
case through the court of special appeals to the circuit court
with instructions to decide that
Issue.
The court of appeals'
decision in Henson ensures that
the State will not dismiss charges and later reinstate them with
the sole purpose of avoiding a
speedy trial violation. Prior to
this decision, the state could
have dismissed charges in bad
faith when the 180 day limit was
approaching and been able to
reinstate the charges at a later
time without violating the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights. The defendant's right to
a speedy trial has been strengthened by Henson and is less likely
to be threatened by a subsequent prosecution arising out of
the same act as the initial prosecution.
- Nicole L. Baines
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